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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s summary 
judgment for the defendants in Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400,1 it 
further eroded the chance that crime victims attacked on property where 
they work or reside would be able to recover from the property owner 
for negligent security measures.  What was surprising about the case was 
not the court’s inclination to protect the property owner, but the ground 
on which the court affirmed summary judgment: absence of evidence to 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.  The 
author appreciates the input of faculty colleagues Ruth Jones, Thomas Main, and John 
Sims, and the thoughts and advice of her torts colleagues Larry Levine, Greg Pingree, 
and Kevin Culhane.  Thanks also to research assistants Byron Beebe and Kristi Morioka 
for their help on this project. 
 1. 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001). 
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raise a triable issue of fact on causation.2  Like many torts professors, I 
am familiar with the incremental increase in barriers to liability 
occurring in California3 and nationwide,4 but the element of “duty,” 
rather than “causation in fact,”5 has been the customary vehicle for this 
resolution.6  In this Essay, I plan to address both the significance of this 
 
 2. Id. at 1152, 1154.  Under California’s summary judgment statute, a defendant 
may obtain summary judgment if she can point to an absence of evidence on an essential 
element of the plaintiff’s claim.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473c(c) (West Supp. 2003).  
The burden of production then shifts to the party opposing the motion “to make a prima 
facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  Aguilar v. Atl. 
Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 510 (Cal. 2001).  Aguilar, Saelzler, and Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, 
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000), constitute a trilogy of cases that bring California’s 
summary judgment standard very close to the federal standard.  Glenn S. Koppel, The 
California Supreme Court Speaks Out on Summary Judgment in Its Own “Trilogy” of 
Decisions: Has the Celotex Era Arrived?, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 483, 483 & n.3 (2002). 
 3. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California 
Experience with “New” Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 456, 466 (1999) (describing a 
general trend in the California Supreme Court that removes power from juries, returns it 
to courts, and tilts in favor of defendants). 
 4. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of 
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 649–50 (1992) (noting the expansion of 
cases imposing liability on landlords for their failure to adopt reasonable security 
measures to protect their tenants and others against foreseeable criminal attacks and 
suggesting that this period of expansion has ended); see also Shelley Ross Saxer, “Am I 
My Brother’s Keeper?”: Requiring Landowner Disclosure of the Presence of Sex 
Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REV. 522, 537–38 (2001) (giving 
examples of cases from several states that limit premises liability cases to situations 
where there is a danger of imminent harm). 
 5. California has condensed causation in fact and proximate causation into a 
single legal standard under the moniker of “legal” or “proximate cause.”  See Mitchell v. 
Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876–79 (Cal. 1991).  However, the test the Mitchell court 
approved contains both the cause in fact and proximate cause strands and employs the 
substantial factor test for cause in fact.  Id.  Likewise, the Restatement and the 
Restatement (Second) both use the term “legal cause” to encompass cause in fact and 
proximate cause.  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 9 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 9 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].  The comments to the second tentative 
draft of the Restatement (Third) reveal the American Law Institute’s judgment that its 
prior formulations had been neither widely adopted nor particularly helpful.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 26 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].  The tentative draft 
separates the two concepts into chapters entitled “Factual Cause” and “Scope of Liability 
(Proximate Cause).”  See id. §§ 28, 29.  In this Essay, I use the terms “cause in fact,” 
“causation,” and “factual causation” interchangeably. 
 6. Because this type of case may require a landowner to have taken steps to 
protect a third person from injury by another, the existence of a legal duty is not a 
foregone conclusion.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 314 (stating that the 
fact that an actor realizes or should realize action is necessary for another’s aid or 
protection does not of itself impose a duty); id. § 315 (stating that there is no duty to 
control the conduct of a third person unless a special relationship exists between the 
actor and the other).  Many cases have discussed the issue of when duty ought to be 
recognized.  For instance, California has at times emphasized the need to show 
foreseeability based on the surrounding circumstances.  See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington 
Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 657–59 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting the rigid “prior similar 
incidents” test for determining the foreseeability of third-party conduct in favor of the 
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analytical shift for plaintiffs who are alleging that negligent failures to 
provide security contributed to their injuries and the potential 
implications for other types of negligence cases.7 
Personal injury attorneys rightly perceive Saelzler as having erected a 
substantial, almost insurmountable barrier to premises liability.8  Under 
cover of the summary judgment statute, the California Supreme Court 
has undercut substantive tort law by shifting the meaning of duty and 
cause in fact and eroding the balance between judge and jury that has 
been developed through years of tort law.9  The court’s interpretation 
 
more fluid “totality of the circumstances” test).  However, the California Supreme Court 
shifted its focus eight years after Isaacs, holding that duty is determined “by a balancing 
of ‘foreseeability’ of the criminal acts against the ‘burdensomeness, vagueness, and 
efficacy’ of the proposed security measures.”  Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 
P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).  The court concluded that the “requisite degree of 
foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents,” and 
that “a high degree of foreseeability is required in order to find that the scope of a 
landlord’s duty of care includes the hiring of security guards.”  Id. 
 7. The concept of judges erecting evidentiary barriers that modify or circumvent 
causation rules is not new.  Some commentators have argued that federal trial judges in 
products liability cases have been doing just that in their roles as evidentiary gatekeepers 
monitoring the admissibility of scientific evidence.  See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding 
the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening 
Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (1999).  More 
generally, scholars have recognized that judges twist causation analysis to accommodate 
concerns that actually pertain to different elements of negligence.  See, e.g., Leon Green, 
The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 544 (1962) 
(claiming that a common vice in analysis of negligence is overloading the causal relation 
issue with difficulties more readily and more adequately dealt with in the consideration 
of other issues); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 68–72 
(1956) (discussing how policy considerations are used by judges to determine whether a 
causation issue should be submitted to a jury); Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 2195, 2201 (2000) (citing historical evidence that causation was 
narrowly conceived in the nineteenth century to protect class interests). 
 8. Saelzler’s attorney’s webpage states that Saelzler is “the last nail in the coffin 
of the tort of premises owners’ liability for third party criminal assaults.”  The Law 
Offices of Borton, Petrini & Conron LLP, Daniel B. Wolfberg, at http://bpclaw.com/ 
wolfberg.htm (last visited May 27, 2003).  Gerald A. Spala, a defense attorney who has 
written a commentary on Saelzler, states that the case seals the fate of many future cases 
and offers land and business owners “a significant weapon in concluding before trial a 
great number of these cases.”  Law Offices of Gerald A. Spala, Tort Law and Criminal 
Acts, at http://www.geraldspala.com/temp/saelzler.htm (last visited June 12, 2001); see 
also Michael J. Estep & Shari Hollis-Ross, California Supreme Court Makes It Harder 
to Sue Property Owners in Security Issue Cases, http://www.burnhambrown.com/publications/ 
article.cfm?pubid=12 (June 28, 2001); Eric A. Schneider, Favorable Defense Case—Liability 
for Criminal Acts: Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, at http://www.amclaw.com/Saelzler.html 
(last visited May 27, 2003). 
 9. See infra notes 86–99 and accompanying text. 
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conflicts with virtually every goal of tort law, whether corrective, 
compensatory, or deterrent.10  The Saelzler decision has the potential to 
leave the most vulnerable and poorest plaintiffs in the worst position to 
obtain compensation for negligence.11  In addition, defendants who owe 
legal duties and have breached them have no incentive to provide greater 
protection from crime to those entering their land, and in fact, may have a 
significant disincentive.12  In short, the Saelzler decision potentially 
undercuts most of what we understand about how tort law should operate. 
The substantive tort implications of the California Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Saelzler, pointed out in dissenting opinions by Justices 
Kennard and Werdegar,13 have provoked little commentary in law 
reviews14 or the public press15 despite the opinion’s serious impact on 
 
 10. Dan Dobbs lists compensation of injured persons and deterrence of undesirable 
behavior as the most commonly mentioned aims of tort law, but suggests they are 
subsumed in whole or in part by the broader, often conflicting goals of morality or 
corrective justice, and policy or social utility.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 
(2000).  This conflict arises because corrective justice focuses on the correctness of 
imposing liability, while the goal of social policy is to provide a system of rules that 
furthers the greater good of society.  Id.  Dobbs suggests that the next generation of torts 
lawyers and scholars must strive for a good mixture of social utility and personal 
accountability.  Id. § 12.  Gary Schwartz associates negligence liability with strong fairness 
values and an obvious concern for public safety.  Schwartz, supra note 4, at 607.  He believes 
that the negligence standard has achieved a synthesis of fairness and deterrence values.  Id. 
 11. Despite the existence of statutory compensation for crime victims in some 
states, those statutory benefits are not nearly as comprehensive as tort damages.  See, 
e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13957(b) (West Supp. 2003)  (limiting recovery under the 
statute to a maximum of $35,000, which may be increased to $70,000 if federal funding 
is available); FLA. STAT. ch. 960.13(9)(A) (1999) (limiting recovery to $25,000 for all 
costs or $50,000 if a written finding states that the victim suffered catastrophic injury); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West 2001) (limiting recovery to a maximum of $25,000); 
see also infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 13. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1155 (Cal. 2001) (Kennard, J., 
dissenting); id. at 1158 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 14. The case has been discussed with regard to development of the standard for 
summary judgment.  See Koppel, supra note 2, at 531–40.  The issue of causation in 
cases involving landowner liability for crimes on premises was discussed generally, and 
I believe wrongly, in an article by Rex Sharp.  See Rex A. Sharp, Paying for the Crimes 
of Others? Landowner Liability for Crimes on the Premises, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 11, 57 
(1987) (asserting that cause in fact would not be proven even if a plaintiff could prove it 
was considerably more probable than not that extra security would have prevented the crime). 
 15. Frederic D. Cohen & Gerald A. Clausen, Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400: 
Landowner Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties and the Question of Causation, 
22 CIV. LITIG. REP. 77, 79 (2000) (analyzing the court of appeal decision from the 
perspective of the plaintiff and defense bars); Maura Dolan, Ruling in Assault Favors 
Landlords, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at B1 (describing the Saelzler litigation and the 
court’s opinion); Sonia Giordani, Plaintiffs Bar Decries New Burden in Premises Suits, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 4, 2001, at 4 (describing the California Supreme Court 
ruling as one that “raises the bar on premises liability cases [and] also requires plaintiffs 
to work harder just to avoid summary judgment in most civil cases”); Dennis Yokoyama, 
Danger Zones, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 45 (describing the opinions of the court and 
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the ability of plaintiffs to seek redress against landlords.  There are 
several possible reasons for this lack of debate.  First, the question of 
what evidence is required to survive a motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of causation is dauntingly technical, involving complex issues 
of procedure, evidence, and tort law.  Second, although the majority’s 
analysis is arguably misguided, it is clear that cause in fact could 
properly negate liability in some cases at the summary judgment stage, 
particularly in light of California’s liberalization of summary judgment 
rules.16  Thus, the issue is not susceptible to a clean resolution that will 
eliminate the problem.  Third, Saelzler purports merely to affirm a long 
line of lower appellate authority,17 and other states’ decisions reflect the 
same thinking.18  Thus the issue may seem either tired or futile. 
 
characterizing the case as one in which the court “continued its recent trend of ruling in favor 
of defendant landowners in premises liability actions involving third-party criminal conduct”). 
 16. The effect of Saelzler and other California Supreme Court cases liberalizing 
summary judgment rules has been to “extend the reach of summary judgment to resolve 
issues traditionally reserved for jury determination.”  Koppel, supra note 2, at 483.  
Indeed, federal law and California law have both “unleashed” summary judgment as a 
tool for case management.  Id. at 554–67.  Judges are permitted to decide on summary 
judgment issues that previously would have been reserved for rulings on a directed 
verdict motion at trial.  Id. at 490.  In addition, even before revisions to the summary 
judgment rules, causation issues were frequently decided before trial as a matter of law.  
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920) (stating that 
the motion to dismiss due to lack of causation should have been granted because the 
jury’s determination that the ship’s lack of life preservers caused the decedent’s demise 
was pure conjecture and speculation); Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding the grant of directed verdict against the plaintiff for lack 
of causation, reasoning that even if the doctor had asked the plaintiff if she were 
pregnant, the plaintiff would have answered in the negative); Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. 
Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 215 (Md. 1990) (holding that no causation can exist where the 
plaintiff has less than a fifty percent chance of survival). 
 17. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1149–51. 
 18. See, e.g., Post Props., Inc. v. Doe, 495 S.E.2d 573, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that, although the attacker could have entered because of the defendant’s 
negligence, he also could have been authorized to be on the premises); N.W. v. 
Amalgamated Trust & Sav. Bank, 554 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that 
it is a “well settled rule that liability cannot be predicated upon surmise or conjecture as 
to the cause of the injury”); Perry v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 635 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 
(App. Div. 1995) (holding that, where a building had no locks for the outside doors, the 
landlord was not liable to a tenant assaulted by her ex-boyfriend because the plaintiff 
offered no evidence that her assailant took advantage of the unlocked doors or that the 
assailant was an intruder with no right or privilege to be present there); Kirsten M. v. 
Bettina Equities Co., 634 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that, absent proof 
of the method by which the perpetrator entered the building, the landlord was not liable 
to a tenant who was raped in the laundry room by an unknown assailant, even though the 
building had defective locks on the main entrance); Wright v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 
624 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (App. Div. 1995) (dismissing the complaint on grounds including 
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The fact that the issues posed by Saelzler are subtle and technical only 
highlights the importance of addressing them with attention and 
vigilance.  The existence of cases that raise the same type of issue in 
other jurisdictions underscores the importance of understanding 
Saelzler’s implications.  I hope this Essay will bring the substantive tort 
ramifications of Saelzler to the attention of judges and lawyers and assist 
them in addressing the causation issues. 
II.  ABOUT SAELZLER 
Marianne Saelzler was delivering a package for Federal Express to a 
large apartment complex during daylight hours when she was attacked 
and injured on the premises by several men.19  Saelzler was unable to 
identify or apprehend the individuals who had attacked her.20  She sued 
the owners of the apartment complex, Advanced Group 400, alleging 
that they had breached a legal duty to her by failing to provide adequate 
security in three ways: (1) by failing to keep entrance gates locked and 
functional, (2) by failing to provide daytime security despite the fact that 
the complex was known to be crime-ridden, and (3) by failing to warn 
her of the risk of criminal attack.21  Although California courts, like 
many jurisdictions, are hesitant to impose a legal obligation (the duty 
element of a negligence claim) on landowners to control the criminal 
acts carried out on the premises,22 Saelzler was able to surmount this 
hurdle.23  She was able to allege facts showing that the complex where 
she was attacked had a record of frequent, recurring violent criminal 
activity, of which the defendants were well aware.24 There was 
considerable gang activity surrounding the complex, and one gang was 
allegedly headquartered within the complex.25  Also, the manager of the 
complex was the only person who had consistent security protection, 
always having an escort when she left her office to travel to her car, even 
during the day.26  Thus, Saelzler showed a pattern of serious criminal 
 
the plaintiff’s inability to prove that the attacker was not a tenant of the building and the 
fact that the attack took place in the stairwell instead of the hallway). 
 19. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1147. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1145, 1147.  The trial court apparently found that the plaintiff had 
offered no evidence that the defendants could have reasonably and effectively warned 
members of the public from unspecified dangers of unknown individuals on the 
premises.  Id. at 1147.  This theory of breach received no attention from the California 
Supreme Court on review. 
 22. See supra note 6. 
 23. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1145. 
 24. Id. at 1147. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1147–48.  Under California’s Ann M. case, these allegations met the 
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behavior at the complex and the management’s knowledge of the danger 
and of the need for security.  As to breach of that duty, the evidence was 
not quite as strong but still sufficient to survive summary judgment.27  
There was evidence from which a jury could infer that the defendants 
had been unreasonable in failing to provide security during daylight 
hours28 or, alternately, in failing to repair or maintain the security gate.29 
The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that there 
was no “reasonably probable causal connection” between the defendants’ 
breach of duty and the plaintiff’s injuries.30  The plaintiff’s evidence did 
not reveal whether the security gate that the plaintiff had found propped 
open had been the source of the assailants’ entry, nor was it clear 
whether the assailants were tenants, visitors, or intruders.31  The plaintiff’s 
inability to specify the origin or identity of the attackers doomed her 
argument that the lack of daytime security was a cause in fact of her 
injury because she could not show that extra security would have made 
any difference; the thought was that tenant assailants would not have 
been stopped by functioning gates or security guards.32  The court of 
appeal reversed, believing that the defendants had neither negated a 
necessary element of the plaintiff’s case nor demonstrated that under no 
hypothesis were there material facts requiring a trial.33 
 
landowner duty requirements.  The court’s approach to duty in Ann M. requires a 
balancing of the foreseeability of harm against the burden of imposing a duty to protect 
against the criminal acts of third persons.  In this way, the court takes into account the 
interests of business owners and land possessors as well as those of customers or other 
entrants on land who are the likely crime victims.  See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping 
Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993). 
 27. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1145. 
 28. The defendants regularly maintained nighttime security; occasionally, and on a 
random basis, they would provide daytime security.  Id. at 1147–48.  Both  the police 
officers and the head of the defendants’ security firm had suggested that the defendants 
begin regular daytime security patrols.  Id. at 1148.  The defendants’ manager was aware 
of extensive crime on the premises, both from approximately fifty police reports in the 
previous year and from reports of its own security force.  Id. at 1147.  Finally, the 
evidence showed that some pizza companies did not deliver to the premises because of 
security concerns.  Id. 
 29. However, the defendants’ security logs showed that they regularly inspected 
access gates to make sure the gates were operational.  Id. at 1148.  Other evidence of 
reasonableness of steps taken to insure security included the fact that the defendants 
posted notices threatening eviction of persons involved in drug or gang activity and had 
carried through with evictions of violent tenants.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 1148. 
 31. Id. at 1147. 
 32. Id. at 1152. 
 33. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 106 (Ct. App. 1999), rev’d, 
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A majority of the California Supreme Court found the case to fall within 
a line of court of appeal cases holding that “abstract negligence,” without 
proof of a causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the 
plaintiff’s injury, is insufficient.34  The court reasoned that, given the 
plaintiff’s factual deficits and what it characterized as a weak and 
speculative expert opinion that daytime security would have made a 
difference, the plaintiff could not show that it was more probable than not 
that additional security precautions would have prevented the attack.35  
The court expressed several reasons for its opinion: the fear that finding 
causation would result in every landowner’s becoming an insurer of the 
safety of those entering the premises, the financial burden that increased 
security would impose on landowners and ultimately, tenants of low-
income housing, and the possibility that a different resolution would 
uniformly preclude summary judgment on the causation issue in future 
cases.36  The court responded to the objection that its opinion would rule 
out recovery against land possessors by asserting that if a plaintiff could 
show that an assailant had taken advantage of a lapse in security, and this 
had been a substantial factor in the assault, causation could be established.37  
Future plaintiffs could prove this causal link through eyewitness 
testimony, security cameras, fingerprints, or other forms of evidence.38 
 
23 P.3d 1143.  The Saelzler majority stated the burden somewhat differently, noting that 
under the amended summary judgment statute, the moving party must make a showing 
that one or more elements cannot be established, at which point the opposing party must 
show she can reasonably expect to establish the element in contention).  Saelzler, 23 
P.3d at 1146–47.  The Saelzler majority also characterized the court of appeal’s opinion 
as having shifted the burden to the defendants because of the defendants’ failure to 
provide security, and it found this approach contrary to the summary judgment statute 
and existing case law.  Id. at 1154.  In fact, the gist of the court of appeal’s thinking was 
that, given the high degree of foreseeability the plaintiff demonstrated to establish duty, 
causation should generally not be defeated as a matter of law unless there is evidence 
establishing that the general causal connection between the  absence of security and 
criminal activity does not apply.  Saelzler, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.  The court of appeal 
viewed this analysis as consistent with the general causation principle that where the 
injury that occurred is precisely the sort of thing that proper care on the part of the 
defendant would be intended to prevent, the court should allow a certain liberality to the jury 
in deciding the issue.  Id. at 110 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 270 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 34. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1149–52.  Appellate opinions in the line the court cited 
include the following: Nola M. v. University of Southern California, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 
(Ct. App. 1993); Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202 (Ct. App. 1989); Lopez v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Ct. App. 1987); Constance B. v. State of California, 223 Cal. Rptr. 
645 (Ct. App. 1986); Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Ct. App. 1985). 
 35. The Saelzler court thought the primary reason for functioning security gates 
and guards at the entrances would be to exclude unauthorized persons and trespassers; 
given the number of problem tenants, the inference that the assailant was an intruder 
could not be made.  Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1151–52. 
 36. Id. at 1152–53. 
 37. Id. at 1154. 
 38. Id. 
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There were two dissenting opinions; one focused on the majority’s use 
of the summary judgment statute to change the respective roles of judge 
and jury, and the other focused largely on the substantive tort implications.  
Justice Kennard believed that the majority opinion blurred the distinction 
between the role of the court and jury, with the end result reducing the 
jury’s role.39  In her view, a plaintiff should survive summary judgment, 
even under the amended and rather stringent summary judgment statute, 
if she could show that a reasonable trier of fact could find in her favor.40  
Justice Kennard suggested that the majority had usurped the jury’s role 
by ruling on whether causation had been established by a preponderance 
of the evidence, instead of asking whether the plaintiff had produced 
evidence from which a trier of fact could have concluded that the 
element had been established.41  Justice Werdegar focused instead on 
what she viewed as a complete distortion of the law on causation.  The 
majority was requiring the plaintiff to show that security devices would 
have changed the outcome, a burden nearly impossible to meet in many 
cases, especially where no eyewitnesses exist.42  Justice Werdegar also 
criticized the majority for wrongly importing policy concerns relevant to 
duty or proximate cause into the causation analysis,43 for rejecting 
entirely the plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony,44 and for making 
unwarranted factual inferences.45 
III.  TORT  CAUSATION AND SAELZLER 
Although both the majority and the dissenting opinions make several 
distinct arguments, the real dispute in Saelzler is about the quantum of 
proof necessary to survive a summary judgment motion and reach a 
jury.46  Justice Werdegar’s claim that the majority distorted the law of 
causation and Justice Kennard’s concern about usurpation of the jury’s 
role both stem from an understanding that cause in fact, like breach, is a 
 
 39. Id. at 1157 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1158, 1164 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1160. 
 45. Id. at 1159. 
 46. It is beyond dispute that the broader standard for summary judgment allows 
resolution of issues that courts would have previously reserved for a jury.  Koppel, supra 
note 2, at 490.  But despite the increasing reach of the standard, there remain questions 
as to whether a plaintiff’s evidence meets the threshold of raising a material issue. 
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quintessential jury question and one that can rarely be proven as an 
absolute.47  Indeed, the preponderance of evidence standard applied to all 
negligence elements permits the inference that a defendant’s breach is 
causally related to the plaintiff’s injury when the fact finder finds it more 
likely than not.48 
Certainly there are cases in which the plaintiff cannot meet the threshold, 
but these do not and should not change the way courts approach 
sufficiency of evidence questions.  The plaintiff’s task is to present 
evidence connecting the defendant’s alleged breach to the injury, and 
sometimes, neither direct nor circumstantial evidence exists.  For 
example, in one California case, an assault, apparently committed by one 
group of patrons upon another, occurred in the Dodger Stadium parking 
lot following a game.49  Even if one could prove that security staffing 
levels had been unreasonable, there was little reason to think that the 
presence of extra security would have prevented the assault, given both 
the huge lot and the lack of any evidence that the event was anything 
other than a random outburst.50  Similarly, in a Utah case, a guest in the 
defendant’s hotel was found murdered, but there was no sign of forced 
 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 433B cmt. b. 
 48. See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 173. 
[C]ourts have often recognized, implicitly or explicitly, that the jury must be 
permitted to make causal judgments from its ordinary experience without 
demanding impossible proof about what would have occurred if the defendant 
had behaved more safely. . . .  [I]f the defendant’s conduct is deemed negligent 
for the very reason that it creates a core risk of the kind of harm suffered by the 
plaintiff, then it is often plausible to infer causation in fact. 
Id.; see also David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1765, 1773–74 (1997) (noting the preponderance standard and stating that “no plaintiff 
will ever be able to establish beyond all doubt what would have happened had the 
defendant’s conduct been lawful”). 
 49. Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 396 (Ct. App. 1985).  Mr. 
Noble and his wife were walking to their car in the stadium parking lot when they 
witnessed other fans urinating and vomiting near a car.  Mr. Noble apparently said 
something to them and a scuffle ensued.  He was injured as a result, and his wife brought 
a claim for emotional distress for witnessing the injury to her husband.  The case went to 
a jury, which evidenced confusion but ultimately found the plaintiff husband to be fifty-
five percent at fault and the wife to be thirty-five percent at fault.  Id. 
 50. Unlike Saelzler, Noble was a case where there were no allegations of any 
specific breaches of security or other negligence, but rather a generalized allegation that 
more security would have prevented the injury.  See id. at 399.  The evidence revealed 
very low foreseeability of injury (five parking lot fights in the past sixty-six night games) 
and that a security force was employed to police the parking lot.  See id. at 397.  It is a 
case in which the evidence supporting duty and breach of duty seemed completely 
inadequate, and there was no basis on which to think security could have prevented an 
altercation between departing fans.  Saelzler, on the other hand, had far more evidence of 
the predictability of criminal activity, specific allegations of negligence with regard to security 
devices on the premises and, despite the lack of proof as to the identity of the attacker, a 
much more plausible claim that reasonable precautions could have prevented the attack. 
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entry.51  With no evidence as to how the murderer had entered the room, 
the court found that even if there had been a showing of negligence by 
the defendant, any supposition as to the manner of entry would be 
speculation.52  In such cases, summary judgment should be granted. 
But the California Supreme Court went well beyond a review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence in Saelzler.  Although the court suggested 
that it was seeking evidence to meet the substantial factor test,53 the 
court’s examples of the necessary proof and the cases it relied upon 
strongly suggest that, unless evidence shows an assailant in fact 
exploited a security breach, there will never be grounds for a case to get 
to a jury.54  The existence of that level of proof would clearly establish 
causation, but it would set the bar too high for most cases, thus depriving 
the jury of the opportunity to make reasonable inferences and deductions 
from the facts.  For example, in Saelzler, a jury, if given the chance, 
might have inferred from the alleged facts that the presence of security 
guards would have deterred criminal attacks, whether from inside or 
outside the complex.  This inference would be logical because the 
manager had security at all times when leaving her office, and daytime 
security had been recommended by both the complex’s own security 
firm and the police.  Yet the court not only precluded the jury from 
considering this issue, but went so far as to adopt the defendants’ theory 
despite the existence of evidence that could have warranted the fact 
finder’s adoption of the plaintiff’s version.55  By characterizing the case 
 
 51. Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 241–42 (Utah 1985). 
 52. Id. at 246. 
 53. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1153. 
 54. Id. at 1153–54.  The court made clear that it is looking for evidence that shows 
the “assailant took advantage of the defendant’s lapse . . . in the course of committing his 
attack, and that the omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury.”  The 
evidence that could prove this might include “[e]yewitnesses, security cameras, even 
fingerprints or recent signs of break-in or unauthorized entry.”  Id. at 1154.  The court 
found Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d  785 (Ct. App. 1996), to be the 
most analogous case.  Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1150.  In Leslie G., summary judgment for the 
defendant was affirmed in a case where the plaintiff sued the owners of her apartment 
building for negligence in failing to repair a broken security gate.  The court of appeal 
stated that without direct evidence that the rapist had entered through the broken gate, 
the plaintiff could not survive summary judgment.  Leslie G., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792. 
 55. See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1154. 
First, and contrary to the Court of Appeal’s hyperbole, the evidence discloses 
no flagrant failure in this case.  As we have seen, most of the assaults and 
similar incidents of crime plaintiff has cited occurred during the night, and the 
record indicates defendants did provide extensive nighttime security.  
Moreover, plaintiff’s own evidence showed that defendants at least attempted 
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as a claim of inadequate, as opposed to nonexistent, security,56 the court 
made the plaintiff’s burden prohibitively difficult.57  This characterization, 
pivotal to the outcome, turned on purely factual inferences that should 
have been made by the jury. 
There is no reason to think courts are able to draw better factual 
inferences than juries in negligence cases.58  In Saelzler, for example, 
Justice Werdegar took the majority to task for making the inference that 
daytime security would only serve the function of keeping unwanted 
intruders from entering the complex; in her view, daytime security would 
have been instrumental in monitoring and controlling the criminal elements 
inside the large complex.59  Given two plausible inferences, the jury rather 
than the court should have made the decision as to which was more likely. 
Many plaintiffs have retained experts to try to surmount the inherent 
uncertainty about whether security would likely have deterred the crime 
that resulted in their injuries.  However, courts tend to disapprove of this 
costly addition to the litigation process.60  In premises liability cases, 
 
to keep all security gates in working order, performing regular inspections and 
repairs. 
Id. 
 56. The parties disputed whether or not there was security during the evenings.  
The defendants pointed to the occasional employment of evening security, while the 
plaintiff pointed to the absence of regular security.  Id. at 1147–48. 
 57. A plaintiff alleging that existing security is inadequate triggers the objection 
that it is impossible to know how much security is enough.  A claim that there was no 
security at all has been more successful in convincing a court that, had some security 
been provided, it would likely have proven an effective deterrent.  See, e.g., Phillips v. 
Perils of Pauline Food Prod., Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 38 (Ct. App. 1995) (ordered not 
published) (distinguishing nonfeasance and misfeasance). 
 58. The fallacy that judges can decide factual issues better than juries has been 
illustrated various times in connection with decisions related to breach of duty.  The classic 
example is Justice Holmes’s conclusion, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 
275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927), that a plaintiff was conclusively unreasonable if he did not stop, 
look, listen, and exit his vehicle to look down the track at a railroad crossing.  Judge 
Cardozo’s opinion in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1934), pointed 
out the problems with Holmes’s approach.  While Holmes furthered judicial economy, he 
did so by sacrificing the fact-sensitivity and flexibility required to reach a fair result. 
There are numerous empirical studies on the issue of jury competency.  For a 
comprehensive review and evaluation of the literature, see Michael J. Saks, Do We 
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1262–80 (1992).  Professor Saks concludes that “[t]he great 
majority of jury verdicts reach the same result that judges would in the same cases.  Id. at 
1287; see also Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, 
in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 248, 248–81 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) 
(describing the results of a survey the author conducted); Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort 
Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 286–88 (2003) (reviewing CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES (2002), a report of empirical study on jury 
awards and concluding that, contrary to Sunstein’s view, judges do only a minimally 
better job at correctly awarding punitive damages than do juries). 
 59. Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1159 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 60. Although the American system generally discourages opinion testimony, both 
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courts frequently reject an expert’s testimony about the role that 
particular security devices or strategies play in crime prevention because 
the experts express only their opinions and cannot testify with any 
certainty as to whether changes would have averted the crimes.61  Yet 
experts, by definition, give opinions, and they do so even on motions for 
summary judgment.62  Plaintiffs seeking to use expert testimony thus 
encounter the same categorical view of causation that they find when 
they rely on lay testimony; courts want the experts to establish causation 
absolutely and often this is impossible.  In my view, because of the costs 
entailed, plaintiffs and defendants would probably benefit if premises 
liability cases could be litigated without the use of experts.  In many 
instances, the experts’ contributions offer little more than confirmation 
of what lay juries would infer.  But, as with other types of cases, an 
expert with proper preparation and analysis might testify persuasively 
that certain precautions would likely have prevented a criminal attack.63  
 
lay and expert opinion may be admissible.  FED. R. EVID. 701, 702; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 702, 
720, 800, 801 (West 1995).  When the jury is equipped to make the factual determination 
without such evidence, expert evidence should be excluded.  See Brugh v. Peterson, 159 
N.W.2d 321, 325 (Neb. 1968) (finding that the expert testimony was neither necessary 
nor advisable as an aid to the jury).  In California, the determination of the competency 
and qualification of an expert is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.  
Redevelopment Agency v. First Christian Church, 189 Cal. Rptr. 749, 757 (Ct. App. 
1983).  Its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of 
discretion is shown.  Id. 
 61. In Nola M., the court criticized the expert for finding fault with all of the 
University of Southern California’s security efforts and explaining how he would have 
done the job better, but being unable to say that a different configuration would have 
changed the outcome.  Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 107 (Ct. App. 
1993); see also Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 794–95 (Ct. App. 
1996) (excluding an expert because of the court’s determination that the expert’s opinion 
was based on speculation); Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202, 209 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding 
that the expert opinion was properly excluded by the trial court as too speculative). 
 62. See Edward Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert Testimony in Summary 
Judgment, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 93, 93–94 (1988) (discussing the use of experts at the 
summary judgment stage and noting that, while summary judgment affidavits are to be 
made on the basis of personal knowledge, experts usually do not have personal 
knowledge).  Brunet notes that current evidentiary trends encourage the use of experts 
and that experts are “common-place” in some types of cases, such as medical 
malpractice cases.  Id. at 94. 
 63. The California Rules of Evidence attempt to assure that the expert’s opinion is 
reliable by limiting experts to those opinions that are based on matter “that is of a type 
that reasonably may be relied upon” by experts in the field.  CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 
(West 1995).  In the event the expert opinion is based on novel scientific principles, 
California uses the Kelly test, from People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).  Under 
that test, the proponent must persuade the judge that the scientific principle or technique 
has been “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
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It is perfectly legitimate to require experts to be reliable, but it is wrong 
to expect their testimony to establish causation conclusively. 
Saelzler’s potential stranglehold on this type of premises liability case 
is apparent upon consideration of what has followed in its wake.  In a 
recent case involving the shooting of a patron during a liquor store 
robbery, the California Court of Appeal followed Saelzler’s lead in 
completely discounting all of the evidence that the plaintiff was able to 
present.64  Initially, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that no duty existed, but the trial court ruled for the plaintiff.65  
The case went to trial, where a motion for nonsuit was granted on the 
ground that one prior robbery at the store did not provide sufficient 
foreseeability to establish a duty and that there was no evidence that, had 
security measures existed, the robbery would have been prevented.66  
The court of appeal held that while the store owed its patrons a duty to 
take reasonable steps to secure its premises against robbery because the 
store had been the site of an armed robbery six months earlier, the 
evidence was insufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden on causation.67  
Although the plaintiff’s expert, a police officer who patrolled the area on 
a bike and owned his own private investigation company, testified that 
several security measures that deter crime could have been used, the 
court found the expert’s opinion too speculative.68  It found no evidence 
that various security measures—fewer papers blocking the windows, 
signs indicating the presence of surveillance,69 a sign advising of limited 
amounts of money on hand—would have made a difference.70  The court  
concluded that a security guard likewise would have made no difference 
because the plaintiff himself was a security guard and did not stop the 
robbery.71  The court paid no attention to the fact that there had been 
only fifteen seconds between the assailants’ entry into the store and the 
shooting, or that the plaintiff had been acting not as a security guard, but 
as a customer receiving change, at the moment he was shot.72 
 
field in which it belongs.”  Id. at 1244 (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 
(D.C. Cir. 1923)).  Federal courts use the four guidelines set forth in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to assess the scientific validity of 
certain scientific evidence. 
 64. Yoon v. Suh, No. B144809, 2001 WL 1227950, at  *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2001). 
 65. Id. at *1. 
 66. Id. at *3–4. 
 67. Id. at *4. 
 68. Id. at *6. 
 69. There was a surveillance camera, but it was aimed only at the cash register and 
did not record the crime in issue.  Id. at *1 n.3.  There was also a door alarm, but it was 
not triggered because the store was open at the time of the robbery.  Id. at *1. 
 70. Id. at *7. 
 71. Id. 
 72. The plaintiff was at the store purchasing cigarettes for resale in his own store.  
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As the  Saelzler court envisioned, there will be some cases in which a 
plaintiff will have the required proof that the security device alleged to 
have permitted the security breach would have prevented the crime.73  
For example, in a recent California case, a plaintiff survived summary 
judgment when she sued her landlord because an assailant had beaten 
her after she had parked in a carport near her apartment.74  She alleged 
evidence to prove both that her landlord had asked the city to close an 
alley adjoining the carport to reduce crime and that some of the parking 
spaces in her complex had been closed off by gates.75  She stated further 
that she did not recognize the assailant as a fellow tenant and that he had 
entered the carport via its ungated alley entrance.76  The court of appeal 
concluded that the defendants had not satisfied their burden of producing 
evidence that would require a trier of fact to find, more likely than not, 
an absence of causation.77 
Cases in which plaintiffs are able to prove causation at the level of 
certainty the court contemplates will be few; the challenge is to 
determine whether cases lacking documentary evidence and eyewitnesses 
can go forward.  It is not possible, or even desirable, to try to specify exactly 
what evidence should suffice to raise a triable issue of fact regarding 
causation; the factual variation is too great and judges must exercise 
 
Although he was trained as a security guard, he was at the defendant’s store as a patron.  
Presumably, he was not dressed as a security guard.  He had a gun with him, but it was 
tucked in the back waistband of his pants.  He had not wanted to leave it in the car.  Id. at *2. 
 73. See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1154 (Cal. 2001).  That 
this level of certainty is required is fairly clear from a number of comments: “[S]he is 
unable to prove they would not have succeeded in assaulting her if defendants had 
provided additional security precautions,” id. at 1145; “Despite her expert’s speculation, 
plaintiff cannot show that roving guards would have encountered her assailants or 
prevented the attack,” id. at 1152; “[I]f the plaintiff in that case, [Leslie G.], could have 
proved her rape could have been prevented by a working security gate ‘we wouldn’t be 
having this discussion,’”  id. at 1154 (quoting Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 785, 793 n.5 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
 74. Wiesman v. Plutsky, No. B151727, 2002 WL 1924028, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 20, 2002). 
 75. Id. at *2. 
 76. Id. at *1. 
 77. Id. at *9.  The court stated that the defendants’ expert’s opinion did not bear on 
whether gating would have deterred or otherwise prevented the robbery.  Id.  This panel 
of the court of appeal appears to have given some teeth to the requirement that the party 
moving for summary judgment make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any 
triable issue of material fact.  See id.  In Saelzler, Justice Chin made it clear that the 
burden on the movant can be met simply by pointing to an absence of evidence in the 
record to support the plaintiff’s prima facie case, thus bringing California to the brink of 
the federal model.  See Koppel, supra note 2, at 533. 
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their judgment.78  In doing so, courts need to remind themselves of the 
large body of law that emphasizes the inherent uncertainty entailed in 
most causal inquiries.  Such ambiguity is something courts simply have 
to live with, or they risk converting causation into an impossibly high 
barrier.79  Years ago, Leon Green cautioned against exactly the situation 
that seems to have evolved in Saelzler and similar cases.80  He described 
the causal relation issues in cases involving failure to provide safeguards 
for the victim’s protection as among the “most difficult” and cautioned 
against framing the inquiry in terms of whether the injury would have 
been averted had the defendant performed his duty.81  As he put it, “To 
ask whether he would have escaped unscathed had the facilities been 
provided may present a false issue heavily weighted against the victim 
and one that can seldom, if ever, be answered.”82  Green also observed 
that much of the confusion about causation stems from the courts’ 
tendency to overburden the element with policy concerns that relate to 
other elements of negligence.83  That is precisely what occurred in Saelzler. 
 
 78. Inevitably, some courts reach different conclusions on the same basic facts, but 
they must grapple with the uncertainty.  Compare Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 
14 N.E.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. 1938) (holding the dismissal of a complaint to be improper 
when a reasonable inference from the facts was that a defective tread caused a fall down 
the stairs, despite the fact that the jury might have concluded that a heart problem was 
the cause, because plaintiffs do not have to eliminate every possible cause as long as they  
show facts from which causation may be reasonably inferred), with McInturff v. Chi. 
Title & Trust Co., 243 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (ruling that the evidence was  
insufficient to raise a jury question on causation where a worker fell down the stairway 
with no handrail because there were no eyewitnesses to the fall). 
 79. In an earlier era, some courts required the same type of direct evidence tying 
the breach to the injury as the California Supreme Court did in Saelzler.  See, e.g., Wolf 
v. Kaufmann, 237 N.Y.S. 550, 551 (App. Div. 1929) (dismissing the plaintiff’s negligence 
claim due to the fact that she could not rule out, by eyewitness testimony or other 
evidence, the decedent’s improper use of the stairs and thus failed to establish a 
sufficient causal connection between his fall and the unlighted stairway).  But as Judge 
Calabresi observed in writing for the Second Circuit, “All that has changed . . . .”  
Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 390 (2d Cir. 1998).  As Judge Calabresi 
recounts the history, Chief Judge Cardozo of New York and Chief Justice Traynor of 
California led the way, leading William Prosser to write that whether the defendant’s 
negligence consists of a statutory violation or a breach of the common law standard, “the 
court can scarcely overlook the fact that the injury which has in fact occurred is precisely 
the sort of thing that proper care on the part of the defendant would be intended to 
prevent, and accordingly allow a certain liberality to the jury in drawing its conclusion.”  
Id. at 391 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 41, at 270 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 80. Green, supra note 7, at 548–62. 
 81. Id. at 559. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 552. 
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IV.  THE SAELZLER RESULT: WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
Although it may be tempting to dismiss Saelzler as a case in which a 
plaintiff’s attorney presented the evidence poorly, the case has greater 
implications.  Likewise, it would be a mistake to view the case simply as 
an endorsement of policy arguments that disfavor plaintiffs’ suing 
landowners following injury by third-party criminal attacks.84  While a 
majority of the court expressed policy concerns that favor land 
possessors, of greater import is that it did so in a manner that sacrifices 
crucial distinctions between duty and causation.85  It is precisely because 
Saelzler can be rationalized or overlooked that it is important to grapple 
with the way in which the case confounds the distinctions between duty 
and cause in fact. 
The matter of whether a landowner has an obligation to protect a 
tenant from criminal conduct on the premises has been addressed 
hundreds of times, and courts have found, in the main, that such a duty 
can exist.86  Like causation, duty is not absolute; duty is established only 
where landowners could foresee a certain type of crime on their property 
and only when the level of foreseeability outweighs the burden of 
imposing a duty in those circumstances.87  Courts are well aware of the 
troubling policy issues that this duty may present.88  A plaintiff who has 
 
 84. Koppel raises the issue of whether the liberal summary judgment statute “will 
provide leverage for judges to divert cases from the jury that they disfavor on substantive 
grounds.”  Koppel, supra note 2, at 539–40.  I believe it not only provides leverage for 
judges, but it also has given judges license to remake tort law. 
 85. This blurring is ironic, as it does not seem to have been the court’s intent. The 
court criticized the court of appeal for blurring causation and duty.  Saelzler v. Advanced 
Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 2001). 
 86. See, e.g., HARRY D. MILLER, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 22.54 (3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing the basis for recognizing a duty and citing various case examples); MICHAEL 
PAUL THOMAS ET AL., CALIFORNIA PREMISES LIABILITY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:50 (1996) 
(providing numerous examples of instances where a duty has been recognized by prior case 
law); John C. Findlay, Jr., Premises Liability—Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park Apartments, Inc.: 
Is the Landlord His Neighbor’s Keeper?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 425, 425 (1997) (stating 
that “[a] landlord’s duty to protect his tenants from third party criminal actions on his 
own property is well defined in the great majority of jurisdictions”). 
 87. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993) 
(“[D]uty in such circumstances is determined by a balancing of ‘foreseeability’ of the 
criminal acts against the ‘burdensome, vagueness, and efficacy of the proposed security 
measures.” (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (Ct. App. 1983))); see also 
supra note 6.  Duty is a question of law, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  See, e.g., 
Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985) (listing multiple 
factors a court must consider in deciding whether to impose a duty of care on a landowner). 
 88. See, e.g., Powell v. Lemon Tree Inv. Co., No. B153363, 2002 WL 31053939, 
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pleaded sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for 
summary judgment on duty grounds has withstood a powerful test. 
However, when the Saelzler majority relied in its causation discussion 
on arguments that liability would burden land possessors, it gave 
defendants a chance to argue the duty question all over again.  The 
policy issues the court raised had nothing to do with causation.89  Rather, 
they were precisely the same burden arguments that already had been 
taken into account in analyzing duty.90  The element of duty, considerably 
 
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2002) (using the policy-oriented factors from Rowland v. 
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), to decide whether there was a duty to an injured 
motorist); Caristi v. Dinielli, No. E029053, 2001 WL 1250164, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 
18, 2001) (discussing the burden of imposing a duty on a landlord to screen tenants to 
determine potential violence and whether such scrupulous screening would even be 
effective in preventing injury); Kotecki v. Walsh Constr. Co., 776 N.E.2d 774, 780 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the effect of imposing a duty on a landowner for injury to 
an employee of a painting subcontractor ignores the complicated working realities of a 
construction site); Smith v. Dodge Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 811 A.2d 881, 888 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2002) (arguing against imposing a duty on a landlord to protect tenants’ invitees 
from criminal activity for fear that this would convert a landlord into an insurer). 
 89. Some scholars believe that causation should not be tainted by policy 
considerations.  See, e.g., Green, supra note 7, at 549–50.  “The moment some moral 
consideration is introduced into the inquiry the issue is no longer one of causal relation.  
Causal relation is a neutral issue, blind to right and wrong.”  Id. at 549.  However, the 
seminal causation opinions reveal that policy does indeed play a role.  See, e.g., Malone, 
supra note 7, at 61.  In his classic article, Professor Malone sought to establish that 
difficult decisions regarding cause in fact are often influenced by policy.  Id.  However, 
even if one accepts the argument that cause in fact decisions are laden with policy, there 
is still a question of what policies are applicable.  Malone’s suggestions are highly 
subject-specific; for example, fact finders nearly always ignore the uncertainty of rescue 
at sea in cases brought by lost seaman, because it would be futile to recognize a duty to 
provide rescue equipment and then allow defendants to escape by seizing on the 
uncertainty that nearly always attends a rescue operation as a reason for dismissing the 
claim.  Id. at 75, 77.  In Malone’s view, the policy issues relating to cause in fact are so 
closely aligned with undefinable values that they are difficult to segregate and 
harmonize.  Id. at 99.  Although he recognizes the power of judges to determine what is 
sent to the jury, Malone views cause in fact as a matter where “the layman’s sense of 
values is deemed to be as good as that of the judge.”  Id. 
 90. To the extent that one can identify general causation policies, they are quite 
distinct.  One generalization Malone makes is that: 
[w]henever it can be said with fair certainty that the rule of conduct relied upon 
by the plaintiff was designed to protect against the very type of risk to which 
the plaintiff was exposed, courts have shown very little patience with the 
efforts of defendant to question the sufficiency of the proof on cause. 
Malone, supra note 7, at 73.  Robertson states that all jurisdictions occasionally relax the 
normal requirements to serve the ends of justice and catalogs eight conceptual devices 
used to do so.  These include the following: shifting from the but-for causation test to the 
substantial factor test, considering joint tortfeasors to be vicariously responsible for one 
another’s conduct, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on cause in fact, using 
res ipsa loquitur to avoid causation difficulties, recognizing that a plaintiff may recover 
from a defendant who destroyed a chance of avoiding physical injury, holding each of 
two tortfeasors liable because they defeated or destroyed the plaintiff’s chances of 
proving causation against the other, using joint and several liability law to extend each 
tortfeasor’s responsibility, and adopting theories of market share liability.  Robertson, 
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evolved from seminal cases such as Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 
Co.,91 casts judges in the role of gatekeepers.  Indeed, many courts 
explicitly balance conflicting policy interests to decide who should be 
permitted to sue and what types of injuries should be deemed 
cognizable.92  The policy concerns presented by the Saelzler court 
majority are hardly trivial; essentially, the primary concern is that 
landowners will become insurers of entrants on land and that ultimately, 
the extraordinary burden of providing extra security will fall on the very 
class of persons the plaintiffs represent.93  However, to insert these 
 
supra note 48, at 1775–76.  Case law provides examples of each of these devices.  Each 
is a response to specific factual obstacles that make causation difficult, if not impossible, 
to establish utilizing the traditional but-for test and reflects a policy judgment that to 
preclude the plaintiff from any chance of recovery would be gravely unfair and indeed 
contrary to good policy.  For example, Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), 
involved two hunters, each of whom had negligently fired in the direction of the plaintiff.  
One piece of gunshot inflicted most of the plaintiff’s damage, but he was unable to 
discern the source of the shot.  The court shifted the burden of proof to the defendants to 
show they were not the cause and, barring their ability to do so, held they would be jointly 
and severally liable.  Id. at 3–4.  Without this burden shift, both defendants would have 
escaped liability.  In Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970), the California 
court, in a somewhat implausible construction of a California statute, held that the burden 
of proving causation in a case involving a motel pool drowning shifted to the defendant 
motel because the motel’s failure to provide a lifeguard deprived the plaintiff of any 
witness to the drowning.  Id. at 474–75.  The difficulty with the analysis lay in the fact that 
the California statute the court was discussing did not require the motel to have a lifeguard. 
 91. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  Justice Cardozo’s conception of duty was narrow in 
this case, reflecting none of the broad policy concerns that typify some of his other 
opinions.  Working within the parameters of the duty element, he assigned the task of 
limiting liability to judges.  See JOSEPH E. PAGE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSE 46–49, 80 (2003). 
 92. See, e.g., Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564 (holding that there is a duty of care to 
persons foreseeably injured on land, regardless of status, unless public policy mandates an 
exception).  Departure from this duty involves balancing the following: foreseeability of 
harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff was injured, the closeness of 
the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame 
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the 
burden to the defendant that a duty would impose, the consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.  Id.  Leon Green was an early proponent of this policy balancing.  See generally 
Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); 
Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929). 
 93. The majority accepted the reasoning of the court of appeal’s dissent, which had 
noted that the ultimate cost of liability would be passed on to tenants in the form of 
increased rent.  Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Cal. 2001).  Similar 
arguments have been made elsewhere in the law (e.g., against recognition of the warranty 
of habitability in the 1970s).  See, e.g., Joel R. Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 
CONN. L. REV. 61, 89–93 (1969) (discussing the argument that the cost increases 
connected with the warranty of habitability will force landlords to raise rents or abandon 
their buildings); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: 
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policy concerns into causation analysis, where there is no analytical 
mechanism to counterbalance them, gives them too much power. 
The policy issues relating to the question of relative culpability as 
between the perpetrator of a crime and a landowner are analytically 
separate from causation issues.  Such concerns might raise proximate 
cause issues, but even there the law favors the plaintiff.  Courts have 
taken the view that they ought to be cautious about releasing a negligent 
tortfeasor from liability, especially if that defendant had created the 
opportunity for the more culpable perpetrator to act.94  Other tort 
doctrines, such as joint and several liability, similarly reflect a policy of 
drawing in every culpable party, rather than releasing one at the expense 
of the other.95  Indeed, the perceived unfairness of joint and several 
liability lies precisely in the fact that the least culpable defendant may 
end up paying the whole; nonetheless, this is still the rule in a large 
 
Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 558–59 (1984) (discussing 
mainstream critical analysis of the revolution in landlord-tenant law, including critics’ 
fears that those least able to pay increased rents would lose more than they gain from the 
warranty of habitability).  Despite these criticisms, many states, either through legislation 
or judicial opinion, have adopted the view that public policy demands that property meet 
certain minimal criteria.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 5 stat. note 1 
(1977) (listing thirty-three states and territories that had adopted legislation requiring the 
landlord to put leased premises into a condition fit for their intended use as of June 1, 
1976); 2 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 16B.04[2] n.42 
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2003) (listing twenty jurisdictions in which state supreme 
courts have handed down decisions establishing something akin to the implied warranty 
of habitability). 
 94. See, e.g., Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983) 
(finding that it was “of no consequence” that the harm to the plaintiff resulted through 
the negligent or reckless harm of a third person); Richardson v. Ham, 285 P.2d 269, 272 
(Cal. 1955) (finding that the intentional act of a third party in joyriding did not supersede 
the negligence of the defendant, who left a bulldozer unlocked, creating a risk of harm to 
the plaintiffs)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 449; see also PAGE, supra note 
91, at 185–89 (stating that defendants should not be permitted to argue a lack of 
proximate cause solely on the ground that a wrongful intervention superseded the 
defendant’s negligence, but suggesting that extent-of-liability issues might arise if the 
type of harm perpetrated was completely different from the misconduct against which 
the defendant was obligated to protect the plaintiff); David W. Robertson, Negligence 
Liability for Crimes and Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL. L. REV. 135, 
138–41 (1992) (discussing the Restatement and Louisiana law). 
 95. The premise of joint and several liability has not changed over time.  In its 
most common application, each of two or more tortfeasors who is a but-for cause of an 
indivisible injury is liable for the full extent of the plaintiff’s injury.  See Robertson, 
supra note 48, at 1789.  This ensures that injured plaintiffs can recover fully, even in the 
event of insolvency or unavailability of one codefendant.  See, e.g., Miller v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 290 U.S. 227, 236 (1933) (citing a number of early U.S. Supreme Court and 
federal circuit court cases as establishing that “[t]he rule is settled by innumerable 
authorities that if injury be caused by the concurring negligence of the defendant and a 
third person, the defendant is liable to the same extent as though it had been caused by 
his negligence alone”). 
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number of jurisdictions.96  Thus, if policy issues such as the burden on 
the defendant or relative culpability as between two potential tortfeasors 
come to dominate cause in fact, they have the potential to undercut not 
only cause in fact, but also other tort doctrines, such as proximate cause or 
joint and several liability, which have distinct, and often conflicting, goals. 
This crossing of doctrinal lines is significant, not merely a technical 
quibble, because it challenges, albeit surreptitiously, the very premise of 
landowner responsibility.  Saelzler, of course, does not completely 
insulate defendants.  A defendant cannot totally ignore the threat of 
liability because it is impossible to predict in advance whether a victim 
will be able to present evidence that could connect a security breach with 
an injury.  However, the likelihood that a plaintiff will be able to show 
that an assailant exploited a security breach to perpetrate a crime seems 
small enough that landowners can plausibly anticipate reduced liability 
on negligent security claims.97  As a result, landowners may decide that 
 
 96. Most states retain either pure joint and several liability or some other form.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt. a (2000); see also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. 
v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1224–28 (2003) (upholding joint and several liability under 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, even where some plaintiffs’ asbestos exposure was 
significantly greater from sources other than the defendants’ negligence).  Even states 
that have reformed joint and several liability frequently retain some aspects of it.  For 
example, in California, joint and several liability was limited by the passage of Proposition 
51, which limits an individual tortfeasor’s liability for noneconomic damages to an amount 
equal to that tortfeasor’s proportionate fault.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 2003).  
However, liability for economic losses remains joint and several.  Id. 
 97. One might legitimately question whether tort law truly has a deterrent impact 
in the real world.  Professor Gary Schwartz reviewed the evidence regarding landowner 
liability for a variety of torts, including failure to protect invitees and customers from 
criminal attack, and found that, as a consequence of the development of tort liability, 
landowners had taken a wide variety of steps to reduce the likelihood of injury.  Gary T. 
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 
42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 416–20 (1994).  Ultimately, Schwartz concludes that tort law is 
“moderately successful” in deterring negligent conduct.  Id. at 444.  Other scholars have 
been more skeptical.  See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
785, 808–13 (1990) (arguing that there are serious flaws in the fault-based, risk-benefit 
analysis that cause the tort system to fail at deterring unsafe behavior; these flaws are, 
among others, the theoretical impossibility of calculating the benefits of accident 
avoidance, the unequal exposure to risk of those least likely to claim or recover damages, 
the inability of the trier of fact to correctly perform a cost-benefit analysis, and the fact 
that the efficacy of tort liability in encouraging safety rests on the dubious assumption 
that all defendants will attempt to maximize profits); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away 
with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 558–59 (1985) (stating that the following 
undermine the deterrent potential of tort liability: society’s failure to instruct people 
effectively in their civil obligations, the perceived unpredictability of the system, the 
failure of even ordinary people to act reasonably at all times, the difficulty that 
organizations confront in actually making cost-effective changes in their behavior, the 
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precautionary measures are not cost-justified.  Further, it is apparent that 
the Saelzler opinion leaves the most vulnerable and poorest plaintiffs in 
the worst position.98  Those who are hurt badly will fare much worse 
than those able to track down an intruder.  People who do not live in 
apartment complexes with security cameras or other recording 
technology will be worse off than those who do.  Landowners will have 
a disincentive to install such devices because these installations might 
assist a plaintiff in proving that a broken gate was used to enter or that a 
stranger committed the assault.  In short, plaintiffs like Saelzler, who had 
no ability to protect herself while making a delivery, take such jobs at 
their own risk and are left completely unprotected.99 
Tenants who live in complexes like that owned by Advanced Group 400 
may not have higher rents due to the landowners’ increased liability premiums, 
but nor will they have leverage either to insist that security function properly 
or to insist that money be allocated to improve it.100  In response, businesses 
such as United Parcel Service and Federal Express may join many pizza 
companies in refusing to allow their employees to enter such premises, thus 
cutting tenants off from services that others in society take for granted.101 
 
tendency to discount the threat of liability, the need of some to take great risk despite the 
threat of the liability, and the generally low average cost of tort liability to most 
defendants); see also Dolan, supra note 15 (recounting an interview with Frederic D. 
Cohen, representative of a consortium of landowners, who stated that the Saelzler ruling 
will not deter his clients from securing their properties, and explaining that the ruling 
was needed to prevent juries from blaming property owners for crimes, notwithstanding 
the existence of good security). 
 98. Apart from the argument that this burden will weigh most heavily on those of 
lower socioeconomic status, one might also consider whether it impacts women more 
than men.  Statistics indicate that female victims predominate in two categories of 
violent crime: violence between intimates and rape.  See Elizabeth A. Pendo, 
Recognizing Violence Against Women: Gender and the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 17 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 157, 165 n.44 (1994) (citing CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 1 (1991)).  In other types of crime, men have 
been victimized at a higher rate, though the disparity between men and women is closing.  See 
U.S. Department of Justice, Victim Characteristics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict_v.htm 
findings (last revised Mar. 9, 2003); see also Dolan, supra note 15 (quoting Daniel B. 
Wolfberg, Saelzler’s attorney, who stated, “I don’t think there is a case out there that has 
a man being a victim”). 
 99. Saelzler may have been fortunate enough to have workers’ compensation.  But 
workers’ compensation may not fully compensate for her losses.  The benefits and the 
costs of workers’ compensation declined, after a period of growth, for most of the 1990s.  
See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 807 (7th ed. 
2001).  Some types of harm are excluded from coverage, including pain and suffering, 
disfigurement, psychic harm, loss of taste, smell, or sensation, and injury to sexual 
organs or function.  Id. at 814. 
 100. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1164 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar 
J., dissenting). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 1147. 
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V.  HOW WILL SAELZLER AFFECT THE LITIGATION PROCESS? 
I have already argued that Saelzler, if applied rigidly and mechanistically, 
has the potential to undermine judicial recognition of landowner duty 
and to muddy the law of causation.  I think the case will affect the 
litigation process as well.  The primary impact will be to make the 
litigation of this type of claim so burdensome that attorneys will view 
most cases presented as exercises in futility. 
One reason that attorneys will disfavor claims like Saelzler’s is 
because the evidence needed to meet the burden of establishing 
causation will commonly be unavailable.  Generally, courts believe that 
the goal of requiring that all available evidence be presented is a salutary 
one.102  I have no quarrel with that aim.  However, there are practical 
obstacles that significantly hinder plaintiffs in gathering that evidence.  
Injured parties, especially gravely injured ones, frequently are not in a 
position to even hire attorneys until months after an accident has 
occurred.  If they wait, evidence such as fingerprints, or the operational 
state of a security device at the precise time of the accident, is likely to 
be unavailable.103  In the rare case in which eyewitnesses exist, they may 
be difficult to find if they do not come forward and identify themselves.  
The difficulty of obtaining evidence does not excuse a failure to pursue 
 
 102. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(Posner, C.J.) (noting that “[a] court shouldn’t be required to expend its scarce resources 
of time and effort on a case until the plaintiff has conducted a sufficient investigation to 
make reasonably clear that an expenditure of public resources is likely to yield a 
significant social benefit”).  The Seventh Circuit rejected Wal-Mart’s contention that 
there was not enough evidence of liability to allow the case to go the jury.  Id. at 359.  
Although the evidence was thin as to the source of the liquid soap that the plaintiff had 
slipped on in the store, the court stated there was no reason to believe that the plaintiff 
was withholding information or that she had failed to thoroughly investigate the case.  Id. 
at 360.  Judge Posner also stated that, given the low financial stakes, it was not 
reasonable to expect the parties to develop the evidence further.  Id. 
 103. For example, in Saelzler, the plaintiff presented evidence that the security gate 
was propped open on the day she entered.  Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1147.  She also presented 
evidence of forty-five other instances involving broken security gates in the year before 
the accident.  Id.  However, she apparently did not produce evidence of why the gate was 
propped open on the day in question, or whether the assailants had entered through that 
gate and broken it in the process.  Id.  The court was very critical of these evidentiary 
deficits.  Id.  Likewise, in Yoon, the plaintiff’s expert inspected the liquor store one year 
after the armed robbery occurred.  Yoon v. Suh, No. B144809, 2001 WL 1227950, at *3 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2001).  Despite the expert’s familiarity with the neighborhood 
through his police work and his testimony that it appeared that no one had made any 
effort to deter any kind of crime on the property, he was unable to testify that things were 
in exactly the same condition as they had been in on the night of the robbery.  Id. 
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it, nor is it unique to this type of premises liability case.104  However, if 
plaintiffs in this type of case are required to establish that the defendants  
in fact utilized security breaches to perpetrate the attacks, as opposed to 
the usual burden on causation, factual deficits become insuperable. 
Even assuming that there is evidence available to present to a court, 
the financial burden of having to develop a case in its entirety early on, 
in anticipation of a motion for summary judgment, is significant.  No 
one could disagree that attorneys should gather the facts before filing a 
complaint, but to meet the threshold set by Saelzler requires a level of 
proof that is far more extensive.  Moreover, the prospect of waiting to 
see whether a motion is filed is risky because, in many jurisdictions, the 
time within which to respond to a motion for summary judgment is 
short.105  While the California Code of Civil Procedure was recently 
amended to extend the notice period to seventy-five days,106 a move 
viewed as favorable to the plaintiffs’ bar,107 Saelzler will compel 
attorneys to expend money and time developing all available evidence as 
soon as they file a complaint.  Further, plaintiffs’ attorneys will need to 
allege and attempt to prove every possible breach of duty, rather than a 
select few, because the chances of proving causation improve 
dramatically with slight differences in issue formulation.108  As an 
example, Saelzler may have come out differently had the plaintiff 
alleged either that the defendants unreasonably failed to provide escorts 
 
 104. See, for example, Warren v. Jeffries, 139 S.E.2d 718, 720 (S.C. 1965), a sad 
case in which a nonsuit in action for wrongful death based on res ipsa loquitur was 
affirmed because of a lack of evidence as to the condition of the car that killed the 
decedent.  The car had never been inspected after the accident. 
 105. See, e.g., BANKR. D. ARIZ. R. 9013-1(g) (stating that the time to respond to a 
motion for summary judgment is thirty days); D.N.H. R. 7.1(b) (stating that objections to 
summary judgment motions shall be filed within thirty days from the date the motion is 
served); TEX. CT. R.C.P. 166a(c) (providing that “[e]xcept on leave of court, the adverse 
party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing 
affidavits or other written response”). 
 106. Section 437(c)(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure was amended to 
extend the notice period, effective January 1, 2003.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(a) (West 
Supp. 2003).  As a practical matter, noticed motions must now be made seventy-five days 
before a hearing and no later than thirty days before the trial date.  Id.  The amendments 
also include a provision allowing supplemental discovery in some cases upon continuance 
by the trial court, and supplemental briefing in some cases.  Id. § 437c(h), (i), (m)(2).   
 107. William M. Hensley, Recent Developments on the Summary Judgment Motion 
Front, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Dec. 2002, at 6. 
 108. Leon Green argued that a connection to a defendant’s course of conduct should 
suffice.  Green, supra note 7, at 555.  However, most courts and scholars do not accept 
this view and require that the plaintiff connect the specific breach to the injury.  See 
Robertson, supra note 48, at 1768–75.  One effect of the narrowness of the requirement 
is that the result may turn on how the breach is described, and thus, the conception of 
causation becomes very easily manipulated.  This result-oriented argumentation exists in 
other areas of tort law as well, such as the risk-foreseeability test in the area of proximate 
cause.  See PAGE, supra note 91, at 104–05.  But it is not a positive trait. 
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for delivery persons or that the defendants were negligent, given the 
prevalent violence at the complex, for failing to warn them not to enter 
the premises unescorted.109  Pursuing proof on all of these various 
scenarios will further increase costs.110 
Another way in which the litigation process may change is that 
defendants will look to causation as the first possible ground for gaining 
dismissal.  Litigating duty issues requires that the plaintiff and defendant 
gather evidence pertaining to the crime rate and patterns on the 
property.111  Because most attorneys presumably would not accept cases 
in which they could not make some showing of the foreseeability of 
similar criminal activity on the premises, a defendant must convince the 
court of the unfairness of allowing the suit to proceed.  The defendant 
must argue that either the burden of imposing a duty is too great or the 
value of imposing a duty is too low.112  Litigating causation issues is 
simple by comparison; if the plaintiff does not have evidence indicating 
that a security device or measure was directly implicated in an attack, 
the defendant will be able to gain dismissal on a summary judgment 
motion.  Unlike a motion to dismiss, however, the plaintiff’s complaint 
will not be judged on the pleadings.  Following Saelzler as a model, a 
court can and will make any number of factual inferences about whether 
an alleged breach is causative.  A court can simply conclude that extra 
security would not help because guards would not have been there to see 
the crime, or that functioning parking garage doors do not matter 
because intruders can always follow legitimate entrants into the 
 
 109. The court viewed the plaintiff’s warning claim as a much more general, vague, 
and unproven contention that the plaintiff, as a member of the public, should have been 
warned against unidentified assailants.  Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 
1147 (Cal. 2001).  This highly unfavorable characterization and the purported lack of 
proof precluded the theory from driving the litigation. 
 110. There will be some reduction in costs if courts adhere to the view that experts 
are not very helpful in these types of cases.  There is no real harm in precluding expert 
opinion, so long as this prohibition is applied to both sides.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 60–63.  Generally, lay opinion as to whether a breach is a but-for 
cause or a substantial factor in bringing about an injury is as competent as expert 
opinion, and thus peculiarly a case for the jury.  See Robertson, supra note 48, at 1768–69. 
 111. See, e.g., Cooper v. House of Blues Entm’t, No. B151007, 2002 WL 
31248870, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002) (indicating that there were several prior 
criminal assaults and other incidents on the premises); Sandoval v. Bank of Am., 115 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that prior criminal assaults on the bank 
mandated increased security). 
 112. Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215–16 (Cal. 1993) (holding 
that, under the duty analysis, prior similar incidents are required to be proven almost 
always for foreseeability to be great enough to outbalance the burden of hiring security). 
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garage.113  Sometimes these factual inferences may seem ludicrous and 
improbable,114 but there will be little a plaintiff can do about them.  The 
end result is that plaintiffs’ attorneys will be extremely reluctant to 
litigate this type of case unless they can clear the exceptionally high 
hurdle of proving causation with certainty. 
VI.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
As noted at the outset of this Essay, there are no easy answers to the 
problem I describe; however, there are several possible ways to 
ameliorate Saelzler’s harsh impact on plaintiffs.  The first of these is 
simply that courts must be aware of the implications of decisions like 
Saelzler and must recommit themselves to time-tested principles of 
proof and causation and to the jury’s role in deciding issues of fact.  It is 
inevitable that challenges to the plaintiff’s evidence will arise before 
trial.  Summary judgment procedure, modeled in many instances after 
federal law, gives the defendant the right to put the plaintiff’s evidence 
to the test early on.115  But procedural revisions to summary judgment 
law cannot be permitted to undermine substantive tort law, whether by 
converting cause in fact into a duty surrogate or by obliterating the 
distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. 
Tort law clearly demands that the plaintiff show that the defendant’s 
breach actually brought about some harm to the plaintiff.  But these 
requirements are moderated by the preponderance standard, which 
clarifies the important principle that causation need not be proven as an 
absolute, or indeed with any more certainty than the “more likely than 
not” threshold requires.116  What rises to the level of plausibly satisfying 
that standard ultimately has to be a matter within the courts’ discretion.117  
Thus, in evaluating the evidence brought before them, judges must be 
 
 113. See Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 792 (1996). 
 114. Courts following Saelzler’s reasoning would seemingly reject the notion that 
security devices, such as locking gates and security companies, have deterrent functions.  
They would assume these measures have no relation to the prevention of crime unless there 
is proof positive that the devices were exploited.  See Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1151–52, 1154. 
 115. Koppel, supra note 2, at 490, 497–506. 
 116. Professor Robertson states that “[t]he juxtaposition of wrongful conduct likely 
to cause a particular type of harm and a victim who has suffered that type of harm is 
sufficient to satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement in the absence of unusual circumstances 
that clearly defeat the normal inference.”  Robertson, supra note 48, at 1775. 
 117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 28.  The comment to section 28(a) 
notes that philosophers have taught that factual cause is “not a phenomenon that can be 
seen or perceived,” but “instead, it is an inference drawn based on prior experience and 
some, often limited, understanding of the other causal factors—the causal mechanism—
required for the outcome.”  Id. at cmt. b.  The comment also acknowledges that “[t]he 
difficulty is often that evidence does not provide any reasoned method for determining 
what the respective probabilities are for the potential causes.”  Id. 
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mindful that the conclusive evidence they seek is not legally required, nor 
is it possible, in many instances, to obtain.  If they remember these basic 
tenets of causation, causation issues can be handled without the need to 
take the extraordinary doctrinal step of shifting the burden of proof to the 
defendant.118  Finally, as much as courts might like to avoid giving jurors 
the discretion to find that a breach was causally related, factual inferences 
have long been the jury’s province, and there they should stay.119 
Courts also need to maintain the distinction between duty and cause in 
fact.120  The duty requirements are so tough and so replete with policy 
considerations that it is hard to believe there would be any policy stone 
left unturned if duty were truly contested.  The effect of moving  
 
 118. Saelzler and cases like it would not easily fit within the recognized theories 
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.  See supra note 90.  It is more accurate to 
view the causal problem in Saelzler as but one example of a problem numerous cases 
share: whether safe behavior would have avoided the injury.  DOBBS, supra note 10, at 
407.  Professor Dobbs gives numerous examples of the liberal impulses of courts in such 
cases.  He states, however, that it is “hard to escape the feeling that the but-for rule with 
its hypothetical alternative case can be applied rigorously in some cases and quite lightly 
in others.”  Id. at 421–22. 
 119. Commentary to section 28(a) also notes that, because “modest [factual] 
differences . . . can substantially affect the power of an inference. . . . [T]he general approach 
of a given jurisdiction toward the degree of freedom afforded juries . . . is critical.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 28 cmt. b.  The comment further notes that many 
courts are lenient if the plaintiff has done all that is reasonably possible to gather and 
present evidence.  Id.  Other courts have been willing to adopt a presumption of 
causation depending on the type of tortious conduct and the difficulties of proof faced by 
the plaintiff.  Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 48, at 1774 (explaining that “when a 
defendant has engaged in [negligent conduct that] often leads to the kind of harm the 
plaintiff has suffered, [courts are] rightfully impatient with the defendant’s claim that the 
plaintiff cannot prove [causation]”). 
 120. Nola M. provides an example of a court that “protesteth too much.”  Nola M. v. 
Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 108–09 (Ct. App. 1993) (“Are we using causation as a 
smokescreen for a policy judgment on whether USC ought to be liable to Nola under the 
circumstances of this case?  We don’t think so.”).  The Nola M. court discussed various 
policy issues, all relating to duty questions, including the issue of judicial line drawing, 
the question of who would pay for security, the issue of whether police protection is a 
governmental or private function, and the question of what impact tort litigation would 
have on landowner insurance.  Id.; see also Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 
(Cal. 1968) (indicating that the balancing test for departure from landowner general duty 
of care involves balancing the following: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the 
degree of certainty that the plaintiff was injured, the closeness of the connection between 
the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the 
defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of a burden to the 
defendant a duty would impose, the consequences to the community of imposing a duty, and 
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved). 
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concerns over the costs of increased security into the causation issue is 
that they gain disproportionate power because causation law has no 
context in which to weigh the burden against relevant countervailing 
considerations.121  Many of the troubling implications of Saelzler and 
cases like it have never been aired simply because the issues are so 
difficult to assess in the causation context.  In short, courts need to be 
much more cognizant of how tort law and policy work in the context of 
negligence.  They need to be more honest about the bases of their 
decisions.  If policy concerns about opening land possessors to liability 
are really at the core, they ought to grapple with them as duty issues.  If  
an absence of evidence to prove a breach is the problem, as it may have 
been in some cases, they should step up to the plate and say so.  They 
should not use rigid assessments of evidentiary sufficiency in proof of 
causation to obscure the true grounds for their decisions. 
As to the specific problem of landowner disincentives to provide 
security for tenants and other entrants on land, in the absence of an 
interpretive shift by the courts, there may be a need for a regulatory or 
legislative structure that imposes certain affirmative obligations on 
landowners.122  Landowners of high crime buildings or complexes 
should not be permitted to completely abdicate responsibility for 
 
 121. Professor Malone asserted that the courts are prone to hold certain plaintiffs to a 
rigorous standard of proof when courts view the claim being litigated as one of less 
importance, or if they question the connection between the harm and the interests the legal 
claim seeks to protect.  Malone, supra note 7, at 72–73.  The Reporter’s Note to  section 28 
of the Third Restatement says that Malone’s insight may help explain cases like Saelzler.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 28 Reporter’s Note cmt. b.  While I think it is 
inevitable that policy considerations will affect courts’ views of causation, the policy issues 
pertinent to causation are distinct from those relating to duty, and the transposition of those 
policies muddies the causation question.  See supra note 90 (discussing causation policy). 
 122. Professor B.A. Glesner discusses several statutory duties in her exhaustive 
article.  These take the form of municipal statutes imposing a duty to provide security or 
to provide clean and safe housing conditions. B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, 
Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the 
Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 701–02 (1992).  Glesner states that these 
statutory requirements provide explicit predictable security standards, but they fail to 
protect the landlord because they generally do not provide that compliance with the 
statute would protect the landlord from liability.  Id.  Glesner also states that the public 
nuisance doctrine may create broad liability; while criminal nuisance is a possibility, 
most public officials utilize civil public nuisance because it is less costly to prove and 
litigate.  Id. at 723–24.  Forfeiture of a landlord’s property interests under federal law is 
also a possibility in the event the property is used to facilitate a drug violation with the 
landlord’s knowledge or consent.  Id. at 742–56.  Professor Glesner concludes that 
increased legal responsibility for landlords is bad from a policy perspective, doing 
nothing to address the root causes of crime and serving mostly to relocate crime to other 
areas.  Id. at 772–73.  She also concludes that heightened requirements for screening 
place the landlords in the position of trying to navigate around other laws that limit how 
much information they can obtain.  Id. at 780–82.  Finally, Glesner concludes that the 
most effective mechanisms include vigorous enforcement of building codes, growth of 
crime watch activities, and increases in youth activities.  Id. at 788–89. 
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providing a reasonably safe environment.123  One possibility would be to 
impose a system of graduated fines on land possessors who offer 
security devices but fail to keep them operative.  While the risk of a fine 
is in no way equivalent to the risk of tort liability, a fine might at least provide 
some incentive for landowners not to leave land entrants at risk.  Another 
possibility would be to require landlords to warn those entering the property 
that their security cannot be guaranteed.124  In the case of delivery persons, 
landlords could be required to structure a delivery method that takes into 
account risks to the potential victim.  Building or housing codes impose 
other requirements on landowners,125 and there is no reason they could not 
impose some measure of responsibility on land possessors.126 
Finally, it would be a mistake to dismiss as an isolated phenomenon 
Saelzler’s subtle undermining of causation and the jury’s role.  
Causation has always been difficult to prove with certainty, and there are 
many other areas of tort law where plaintiffs rely on the preponderance 
 
 123. Even critics of the duty to protect acknowledge that, in some instances, there 
must be minimum standards.  Professor William K. Jones takes the view that victims of 
crime can only obtain those protections for which they are prepared to pay.  William K. 
Jones, Tort Triad: Slumbering Sentinels, Vicious Assailants, and Victims Variously 
Vigilant, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253, 282–83 (2001).  He would impose limited duties in 
tort stemming from violations of building codes, breaches of express or implied promises 
about the safety of the premises, and several other limited scenarios.  Id.  But recognition 
of these limited duties would not solve the causation problem that plaintiffs encounter.  
Thus, a regulatory approach may prove necessary. 
 124. Although the trial court dismissed Saelzler’s failure to warn claim on the 
ground that she had no proof that it would have been feasible or effective, see Saelzler v. 
Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1148 (Cal. 2001), in reality, warnings are entirely 
feasible.  A sign posted on a gate warning delivery persons that they should not enter 
without an escort, or that their safety cannot be guaranteed, would easily alert entrants to 
the risk and permit them to make informed decisions as to whether or not to enter.  Of 
course, no landowners want to post such signs on their premises, but if landowners are 
largely protected from negligent security claims by Saelzler, the lack of warning 
obligations only compounds the risks to land entrants. 
 125. Some states have statutes that require disclosure of specific items to 
prospective purchasers and lessees.  Professor Saxer identifies disclosure of sex 
offenders living in the area as a prime example.  Saxer, supra note 4, at 552.  Section 
2079.10a of the California Civil Code requires that written leases and rental agreements 
disclose the existence of a database of registered sex offenders, relieves the lessor of 
further disclosure obligations, and precludes the sex offender from bringing suit against 
the disclosing lessor.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.10a (West Supp. 2003). 
 126. The benefit of a statutory approach is that it would give a land possessor 
specific guidance about what must be done, both with regard to maintaining property and 
with respect to disclosure to land entrants.  A land possessor might worry that disclosure 
of criminal activity could result in invasion of privacy or other tort actions.  Statutes 
might shield the land possessor from liability in the event disclosures are made as 
required.  See Saxer, supra note 4, at 562–64. 
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standard to surmount causal uncertainty.127  If summary judgment procedure 
is understood as giving courts license to change the substantive law sub 




 127. One such area is res ipsa loquitur.  Though res ipsa is a doctrine used to 
establish breach, it has a causative aspect: the jury is asked to decide whether the 
defendant is the most probable responsible cause.  Normally, judges rely on the common 
knowledge and general experiences of jurors to make this assessment.  See DAN B. 
DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 176 (4th ed. 2001). 
 128. In fact, Professor Koppel’s study of summary judgment procedure under both 
the federal and California standards led him to conclude that “the premonitions of the 
dissenting justices in both trilogies regarding the overuse of summary judgment were not 
without substance.”  Koppel, supra note 2, at 573. 
